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Moral Awareness and Therapist Use of Self 
Rick Reinkraut  
 
 
Introduction	  
	  
Among the myriad issues that are of concern to counselors is consideration of the way 
the counselor uses her or himself for the benefit of the client. As Combs, Avila and 
Purkey (1971) wrote over thirty-five years ago: "The helping professions demand the 
use of self as an instrument. Effective operation demands personal interaction. The 
helper must have the ability to share himself on the one hand and, at the same time,  
possess the capacity for extraordinary self-discipline" (p. 30). 
 
It is this requirement of self-discipline that distinguishes the injunction to "know 
thyself" from the demands of the therapist's use of self. Knowing oneself incurs no 
obligations regarding how this self-knowledge may impact on others. The self-
knowledge that is necessary for a counselor to have in order to use oneself in the 
service of the therapeutic benefit of another demands the intentional use of varied 
aspects of the self on behalf of another. 
 
In what follows the concept therapist use of self (also referred to as self as instrument) 
is discussed addressing why it is important to incorporate into this concept the moral 
awareness of the counselor in the service of helping one's clients to affirm that aspect 
of themselves. A clinical example is presented to exemplify the issues being discussed. 
The discussion addresses moral situatedness within a multicultural world and the 
differences between positivism and perspectivism are contrasted. The issue of moral 
neutrality on the part of the counselor is discussed. The discussion will conclude with 
a proposed framing of the concept of therapist use of self.  
 
The Therapist Use of Self 
 
In the literature on therapist use of self the person of the therapist is regarded as a 
central factor in the salutary effects of the therapeutic endeavor. Satir (2000) wrote: 
“The person of the therapist is the center point around which successful therapy 
revolves” (p. 25). 
 
Similarly, Aponte and Winter (2000) noted that it is within the context of a social 
relationship that therapeutic change occurs. They write that “at bottom, the single 
instrument each training model actually possesses is the ‘person’ of the therapist in a 
relationship with a client” (p. 85). 
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Lambert and Barley’s (2001) findings supported the importance of the person of the 
therapist. They wrote that the relationship factors between the client and the 
therapist are most salient in their contribution to the positive outcome of therapy (see 
also Messer and Wampold (2002)). Their conclusion is that attending to the 
therapeutic relationship in both practice and research will have more benefit on client 
outcome than will a focus on particular therapeutic techniques. 
 
Consistent with these conclusions were the earlier findings of Whiston and Sexton 
(1993). They wrote: “More than any other element to date, the therapeutic 
relationship is significantly related to positive client outcome… We suggest that the 
therapeutic relationship is the foundation from which other activities are built” (p. 45). 
This underscores the importance of how a clinician is present in the therapeutic 
relationship. 
 
Whereas Satir, and Aponte and Winter affirm the importance of the person of the 
therapist within the therapy relationship without naming relevant specifics, Peterson 
and Nisenholz (1999) named seven “personal resources” that characterize their 
framing of self as instrument. They maintain that the counselor should have acuity in 
observing the verbal and nonverbal behavior of the client, should be multiculturally 
competent and be able to “break out of their own cultural capsules,” should have the 
energy to enter the subjective world of the client in order to help achieve change, 
should be able to use clinically appropriate self-disclosure and be able to help the 
client articulate his/her concerns. As well the counselor should be able to be 
appropriately confrontational and be able to foster an intimate therapeutic 
relationship. And lastly, the counselor should be in the process of personal growth (p. 
12-13). In their discussion no mention is made of the relevance of the therapist’s 
awareness of her or himself as a moral agent. 
 
Yet in the course of living the challenge of confronting the multiplicity of factors with 
which persons deal in trying to do what they regard as the "right" course of action is a 
matter of considerable significance. In living who does not at times struggle with 
competing claims which complicate one's ability to gain clarity regarding the actions 
one will take that one regards as the right action to take? Sugarman and Martin (1995) 
wrote: "…psychotherapeutic conversations, and associated change processes, 
inevitably are saturated with moral concerns, whatever the professional/scientific 
approach taken or the social cultural context in which psychotherapy occurs" (p. 344). 
A great challenge in living is the challenge of taking responsibility for the actions that 
follow from one’s choices. 
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In critiquing contemporary psychology, Cushman (2002) wrote: 
 
It seems likely that by uncritically colluding with the social forces pushing psychology 
towards ever-more market-driven and scientistic therapy practices, we are in the 
process, inadvertently or not, of shaping a psychology that …. erodes the one quality of 
personhood that I would suggest is universal in and indispensable to humankind: the 
ability to think of oneself as a moral and civic being and to practice moral discourse and 
have the capacity for moral action. (p. 112) 
 
By including the importance of moral awareness in the concept of therapist use of 
self, this dimension of personhood is affirmed as relevant and important for 
consideration and development. 
 
A Clinical Vignette 
 
Regarding assuming responsibility for one's choices, I recall a psychotherapy client 
with whom I worked some years ago. He was a white male graduate student in his late 
twenties. His parents lived in another part of the country. While not his presenting 
concern, he soon was focusing on his discomfort with not having “come out” to his 
parents. He was socially and politically active as a gay man within his community at 
his university. He was thoughtful and clear regarding his commitments to combat the 
sources and consequences of 'homoppression' (the term 'homopression' is intended 
to highlight the oppressive effects on gay/lesbian persons of homophobic behavior, 
attitudes, fears be they on the part of others or the gay or lesbian persons own 
internalized homophobia).He was in an enduring relationship with his male lover 
whom he had met shortly after starting graduate school. He struggled with the 
competing concerns of on the one hand being committed to being open in the world 
about being gay, and on the other hand not wanting to cause distress to his parents to 
whom he was devoted. Over the course of our work together it became clear to me, as 
it was to him, that his respect for himself was being compromised by not coming out 
to his parents. I explored with him if his diminished self-respect reflected his sense 
that he was not living up to his moral values and commitments, particularly the value 
that he placed on honesty and integrity. He believed that it did and decided that it was 
past time for him to act in terms of these moral commitments. We spent some time 
exploring how he might approach his parents, which he subsequently did. He was able 
to deal sensitively with their surprise and initial distress, in large part he said because 
it was so clear to him that he was acting in ways that were consistent with his moral 
principles. 
 
At the time of our work I recognized that I could have encouraged him to focus on his 
feelings of diminished self-respect without addressing the matter of his moral 
commitments. I chose otherwise because I had come to understand from what he had 
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told me that the kind of person he was in the world mattered deeply to him, that is, a 
person who acted in terms of his moral principles.  
 
Moral Situatedness 
 
The approach that I took is consistent with the position that Doherty (1995) speaks to. 
He wrote: 
 
Just as therapists do not supply clients with feelings and desires but rather help clients 
discover and work better with them, the same is true for moral beliefs and sensibilities. 
The client brings to therapy the moral raw material that we work with collaboratively; 
people are continually explaining and justifying their own behavior and evaluating the 
morality of others’ behavior. The therapist is a consultant in this ongoing process of 
moral reflection. (p. 39) 
 
In my work with the client, among other things, I served as a moral consultant. 
 
Roffman (1996), in her discussion of the use of self as instrument in clinical training 
took the view that the subjective experience of the clinician must be understood 
within the broader context of the social/cultural realities within which that 
subjectivity is experienced. Roffman’s position places upon the clinician the 
expectation that one comes to understand the situatedness of one’s subjectivity 
within the broader socio-cultural contextual reality of one’s life. Within this socio-
cultural reality resides the moral values of the larger culture of which one is a part as 
well as the moral perspectives that one comes to develop as an individual. An 
awareness of the points of agreement and disagreement between oneself and one’s 
socio-cultural context serves to clarify where one places oneself in the broader 
landscape of one’s lived experience. This awareness also helps to increase one’s 
attention to the differences that may exist between oneself and one’s clients 
regarding socio-cultural experiences and moral perspectives.  
 
Writing about ethics and morality in psychology, Prilletensky (1997) stated: "Ethics, 
according to Sidgwick (1922), is the 'study of what is right or what ought to be, so far 
as this depends upon the voluntary action of individuals' (p.4). In this sense, a right 
moral action is that which enhances the well being of others (Franken, 1963; 
Halberstam, 1993; Singer, 1993; Williams, 1972). This is the primary concern of ethics 
and morality" (p. 6 517). The notion of "well-being" is one that is bounded to cultural 
norms and therefore imbedded in culturally determined concepts of what constitutes 
a right moral action. 
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Christopher (2001) discusses the culture-based nature of moral perspectives. He 
wrote: "I use the term moral visions to refer to the constellations of cultural values 
and assumptions that constitute our understanding of the nature of the person and 
the good life" (p.120). He goes on to say: "Moral visions are central themes running 
through the drama of culture and combine to help constitute the total web of 
meaning and significance we call culture" (p. 126). 
 
It is within the therapeutic interchange that Christopher sees the opportunity for 
clarifying cultural differences between counselor and client regarding moral 
perspectives. He sees the dialogic process as providing a unique opportunity for the 
counselor to move outside of his or her cultural capsule. He wrote: 
 
If we are not aware that our perspective is limited by the horizon of our own moral 
visions, the Other's outlook and behavior can appear pathological, mistaken, distorted, 
or even evil to us. Because we are immersed in the background assumptions and 
practices of our own culture, it is natural for us as therapists to assume much more than 
we can ever fully recognize or articulate. It is only through the willingness to have our 
own cultural 'givens' questioned through dialogue that cultural differences can be 
bridged….(p. 126) 
 
The recognition of the importance for counselors of multicultural competence (Sue, 
Arredondo, McDavis, 1992; Arredondo, Toporek, 2004) is ubiquitous. As Miller (2001) 
wrote: "…our diagnoses and treatment goals carry with them implicit moral 
commitments that certain ways of living, being, and relating, are good, right or 
virtuous, and others are not" (p. 350). His viewpoint is consistent with Hoshmand's 
(2003) view that psychological practice has a dual nature, namely, that it is a science-
based cultural enterprise. This underscores the importance of clinicians fostering a 
dialogic process in which the converging and diverging points of their own and their 
clients' cultural and moral horizons emerge. 
 
In this context the hermeneutic perspective has particular saliency. Betan (1997) 
wrote: "Hermeneutics involves a recognition that the observer is always part of, rather 
than detached from, what is being observed… Thus, one cannot intervene in human 
affairs without being an active participant in defining dimensions of human conduct 
and human worth. In viewing the therapist not as a detached 'analyst' of ethics, who 
we are and how we are become as important as what we do in an ethical 
circumstance" (p. 353). 
 
As will be discussed later, the relevance of the moral perspective of the counselor has 
been over-shadowed by a tradition within psychology of the moral neutrality of the 
therapist. 
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The concept of the situatedness of experience was explored by Fay (1996) in his 
discussion of the replacement of positivism with perspectivism in social science. He 
wrote: 
 
…philosophically the demise of science as the paradigm of intellectual activity is tied to 
the death of positivism and the concomitant emergence of perspectivism…in opposition 
to positivism which conceives science as the method par excellence for seeing Reality 
directly, perspectivism asserts that every epistemic endeavor – including science – takes 
place from a point of view defined by its own intellectual and political commitments and 
interests. (p. 2) 
 
The implications for psychotherapy of Fay’s comments are clear. Namely, as persons 
and as therapists we engage from a particular vantage point. As therapeutic agents 
we must own the moral implications no less than the intellectual and political 
implications of our commitments and interests. 
 
MacIntyre (1984) speaks to this point in saying: “Every action is the bearer and 
expression of more or less theory-laden beliefs and concepts; every piece of theorizing 
and every expression of belief is a political and moral action” (p. 61). In so saying 
MacIntyre reminds us that through our actions we evince the beliefs and 
commitments that we hold. In leaving out moral considerations from the 
psychotherapeutic conversation, therapists communicate through their silence both a 
lack of interest in such matters and the lack of relevance of such matters to the 
therapeutic endeavor. 
 
Psychotherapy and Moral Neutrality 
 
The tradition in psychotherapy, however, has been to withhold addressing moral 
matters. Doherty (1995) wrote that “A cornerstone of all the mainstream models of 
psychotherapy since Freud has been the substitution of scientific and clinical ideas for 
moral ideas” (p. 9). In this vein Cushman and Gilford (2000) refer to the profession’s 
“prohibition against engaging in moral discourse” (p. 992). It is no wonder that in the 
literature on therapist use of self the relevance of the therapist’s moral perspective is 
rarely discussed. 
 
Aponte and Winter (2000) wrote: 
 
It is inevitable that therapists will evaluate and judge problems through the lens of their 
own worldviews, that they will naturally conjure up goals that fit with their ideals, and 
be inclined to propose solutions that fit with their own views of life. Few psychotherapists 
will argue today that practitioners can actually be ‘value-neutral’ in therapy (p. 136). 
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In so saying Aponte and Winter dismissed the vaunted notion of the therapist’s moral 
neutrality. The notion of moral neutrality supports the conditions whereby therapists, 
by their silence on matters relating to moral responsibility, justice and injustice tacitly 
collude with an ahistorical, acontextual framing of individual suffering which results, 
as Prilleltensky (1997) wrote, in “attributing excessive weight to individual factors in 
explaining social behavior, and by abstracting the individual from the sociohistorical 
context” (p. 523). 
 
A tension, then, exists between the goal of supporting the client in making his or her 
choices and the goal of not using one’s influence to impose one’s own perspective on 
the client’s choices. However, MacIntyre (1984) discussed a difficulty for therapists (as 
well as others) in recognizing one’s effect on the choices and actions that another 
takes. He wrote: 
 
My own future from my point of view may be representable only as a set of ramifying 
alternatives with each node in the branching system representing a point of as yet 
unmade decision-making. But from the point of view of an adequately informed 
observer provided both with the relevant data about me and the relevant stock of 
generalizations concerning people of my type, my future, so it seems, may be 
representable as an entirely determinable set of stages. Yet a difficulty at once arises. 
For this observer who is able to predict what I cannot is of course unable to predict his 
own future in just the way that I am unable to predict mine; and one of the features 
which he will be unable to predict since it depends in substantial part upon decisions as 
yet unmade by him is how far his actions will impact upon and change the decisions 
made by others – both what alternatives they will choose and what sets of alternatives 
will be offered to them for choice. Now among those others is me. It follows that insofar 
as the observer cannot predict the impact of his future actions on my future decision-
making, he cannot predict my future actions any more than he can his own; and this 
clearly holds for all agents and all observers (p. 96). 
 
In so saying, MacIntyre’s observation has profound implications for psychotherapy. A 
therapist may not want to influence, with his/her value system and moral beliefs, the 
choices that a client is trying to make and the actions to take. It is inevitable, as 
MacIntyre demonstrates, that by virtue of the therapist’s participation in the client’s 
sorting out process, the therapist, whether intended or otherwise, impacts on the 
client’s decision-making. 
 
MacIntyre makes clear that by virtue of our engagement with our clients we are 
affecting the decisions they make and the actions they take. We are not responsible 
for their choices and actions (to the extent that the client is capable of being a 
responsible agent and the therapist is being ethical), but as MacIntyre asserts we are 
certainly implicated in those decisions and actions. In this context Satir (2000) wrote: 
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"Once, a man came to my office with a bullwhip in his hand and asked me to beat him 
with it so he could become sexually potent. While I believed that it was possible that 
his method would work for him, I rejected it on the bases that it did not fit my values. I 
offered to help him in other ways and he accepted" (p. 20). 
 
By virtue of her awareness of her values, Satir was in the position of making the choice 
to decline to participate with her client in a method of work that was incompatible 
with her moral position. She offered an alternative that the client accepted. She did 
not attempt to avoid the issue by presenting herself as if she was morally neutral on 
this matter, nor did she attempt to impose an alternative method. She engaged with 
the client in a way that acknowledged the incompatibilities with which they were 
faced and gave him a choice that he took. 
 
The position that Satir took is in line with the perspective articulated above by Aponte 
and Winter. It is also consistent with Carl Rogers' articulation of the importance of the 
therapist being authentic. For the counselor to pretend to be someone he or she is not 
presents the client with a relational encounter in which the client must choose 
between his or her perceptions of the authenticity of the counselor and what the 
counselor is inauthentically communicating. 
 
Inevitably clinicians are challenged to make decisions regarding their capacity to be of 
help to clients given the clients' therapeutic needs. The choices, as helpers, must be 
most particularly those aspects of oneself that the counselor believes will be 
therapeutically helpful. Certainly that must include a conception of what counts as 
being helpful and for what purpose(s). Each theory of psychotherapy addresses itself 
to the question of what will be helpful based on its understanding of what has gone 
awry. As the earlier cited writers have averred, it is the person of the therapist who 
plays a crucial role in the process and outcome of any psychotherapy. As a counselor 
one is bound by an ethical requirement not to offer services to a client whose interests 
cannot be addressed respectfully and competently.  
 
Clinical Vignette Revisited 
 
Referring back to the clinical vignette discussed above, among the ground rules that I 
negotiated with the client (I’ll call him Sam) were that we each had the prerogative to 
ask each other any question we cared to and that we each had the prerogative to 
answer that question or not. At the start of our work he had told me that he was a gay 
man and had asked if I had had experience working with gay people. I told him that I 
had. He did not ask about my sexual orientation. He did comment from time to time 
that there were ways in which I reminded him of his father and wondered aloud if he 
was likely to get the same caring and support from his father that he felt he got from 
me if his father knew that he was gay. 
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I am a gay man. It matters to me as a political and moral act to be out. That said, in my 
work with my clients I believe I have an obligation to place my clinical responsibilities 
to my clients ahead of my personal moral commitments. I make self-disclosures to my 
clients only when I believe they are in the service of the therapeutic work and when 
they do not compromise my sphere of privacy. 
 
Peterson (2002) discussed the ethical practice of self-disclosure. She wrote: 
 
The literature on self-disclosure suggests that an ethical therapist might do well to 
consider the following questions before disclosing personal information to a client: (a) Is 
this information necessary to protect the client’s informed consent? (b) Is my purpose in 
disclosing this information to benefit the client or to benefit myself? (c) Will this 
particular client use this information in a way that is helpful? (d) Will disclosing this 
information interfere with our therapeutic progress, such as by contaminating the 
client’s therapeutic transference? (p. 30) 
 
I believe that the self-disclosure to be discussed meets Peterson's criteria for non-
harmful self-disclosure. 
 
It was not until near the end of our work together (considerably after the events 
described above) that Sam asked about my sexual orientation. I told him that I would 
answer him but first I asked him why he had not asked me that question earlier. He 
told me that he had thought about asking me at various times but had felt that it 
would be better for him to focus on his experience of me rather than be guided by 
labels that might effect what he did or didn’t tell me. I did tell him that I was gay. He 
told me that he was glad he hadn’t known before talking with his parents because 
having been so open with me without knowing my sexual orientation had made it 
somewhat easier to tell his father with the hope that his father would come to accept 
him. I cite this as an instance in which clinical judgment led me to be silent regarding 
an issue of personal moral significance (being “out” in the world) because of my 
judgment regarding the needs of the client. 
 
The purpose in this discussion is not to encourage the imposition of moral 
considerations into psychotherapy. Rather, the purpose is to speak on behalf of the 
recognition that moral considerations have relevance in psychotherapy and therefore 
have relevance for our understanding of the concept of therapist use of self. 
 
Use of Self and Moral Awareness 
 
As the therapist develops the ability to use the self on behalf of the client, the 
injunction to do no harm must always be considered. Among the ways that any 
clinician can do harm is to impose her or his viewpoint on the client rather than 
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supporting the client to develop the viewpoint(s) that serves the client's therapy goals 
and life commitments. 
 
Counselors have a responsibility to their clients to delve deeply into themselves in 
many ways including those situations in which the counselor has been confronted by 
moral dilemmas. The counselor's understanding of these dilemmas and the choices 
and actions taken in response to them informs the counselor about his or her 
positionality as a moral agent and how one has met what one regards as one's moral 
responsibility. In this way one learns about one's own moral situatedness. This self-
awareness requires a stepping back from the conceptual landscapes we inhabit in 
order to achieve what Hoshmand (2001) describes as “reflexivity, or accounting for 
one’s own philosophical biases…” (p. 108).  
 
The following sorts of questions are significant to ask in order to increase this level of 
self-awareness: What do you believe is the right way to behave in relation to others 
with whom you interact? How do you believe you should act when other's attitudes 
and/or behavior cause you to feel oppressed? What obligations do you have to the 
community or communities of which you are a member? What obligations do you 
have in the face of perceived injustice? What is required to be a morally responsible 
person? These are questions that address one's moral perspective. The answers to 
these (and like questions) require further exploration. It is important that we go on to 
challenge ourselves regarding the reasons for the answers to the questions. In other 
words, on what bases do we make the choices we make. This level of reflexivity serves 
to increase one’s understanding of one’s relationship to one’s values and moral 
positions. In knowing more about oneself in these respects one can use this 
knowledge to avoid unintentionally imposing one's own views on those of the client 
and thereby increase one's effectiveness in helping the client clarify and affirm her or 
his own moral positionality. 
 
The therapist does not cease to be the person he or she is when walking into the 
therapeutic encounter. We take ourselves with us wherever we go. If counselors leave 
out of therapeutic discourse the reality that each person is an agent in a life that is 
lived out in a moral landscape then we contribute to the landscape becoming morally 
barren. 
 
The therapist has the responsibility to be present on behalf of the client. It is not to 
impose answers on others’ questions. Therapy is a conversation. We have all 
participated in vapid conversations. Nothing is gained from them. Benefits are gained 
from respectful conversations that address matters of moment that speak to issues of 
meaning and relevance. Among those conversations are those that address one's 
sense of oneself as a moral agent. They are an aspect of what is involved in being a 
person. 
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A unique aspect of the field of psychology is that as one looks through the window at 
others there is a mirror beside the window at which one can look at oneself. By taking 
the occasion to look in the mirror one has the additional opportunity to examine one's 
own values, moral perspective, confusions and uncertainties. This is in the service of 
enhancing one's reflexivity. 
 
Whatever may differ between oneself and one's client, each is a person. Certainly the 
differences between persons matter profoundly. In order to be competent clinicians 
one must be aware of the differences between oneself and each person with whom 
one works and strive to understand, respect, and honor those differences in order to 
be aware of and sensitive to their meaning and moment to and for the client. 
 
Conclusions 
 
In the moral arena, as in others, one cannot know in what ways one is different from 
another until one situates oneself somewhere. Whatever may be the pretensions of 
psychology to moral neutrality, in the lived experience persons are not morally 
neutral. Each of us is morally positioned. Whether or not one’s position is fully 
articulated, each person takes action in the moral realm and has responsibility for 
those actions and their consequences. If psychotherapy is not to be irrelevant to the 
lived experiences of real persons it must recognize, honor and embrace the moral 
aspects of human life. As counselors we must examine and re-examine where as 
persons we position ourselves within a moral landscape. As discussed earlier, Fay, 
Christopher, and Betan enjoin us to recognize that there is a point of view, a 
perspective, from which one articulates one's moral situatedness. In this way we can 
help ourselves to gain increasing clarity about where each one of us is situated in our 
respective landscapes and examine more deeply the values, assumptions, attitudes, 
axioms that characterize the moral perspective from which one views the world. We 
thereby increase our reflexivity and concomitantly decrease the likelihood that we 
will, because of a lack of awareness, impose our moral viewpoints. This is in the 
service of supporting clients in meeting the challenges they face and thereby more 
effectively using the persons we are in being present with our clients. In this 
discussion the focus has been on the inclusion of moral awareness in the 
understanding of the concept of therapist use of self. There are many aspects of 
ourselves that are relevant to how one is present with a client. Each of these aspects 
must be used consciously and purposefully on behalf of the client. With this in mind I 
propose that therapist use of self be understood to mean the intentional use by the 
therapist of his or her abilities, experience, identity, relational skills, moral awareness, 
knowledge and wisdom in the service of the therapeutic benefit of the client. 
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